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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
  
This is an appeal from the District Court’s order 
dismissing the complaint filed by individual shareholders of 
Valeant Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Valeant” or the “Company”) as 
untimely.  A class action (the “Class Action”) was filed against 
Valeant on behalf of investors who purchased its stock between 
February 23 and October 20, 2015 (the “Relevant Period”).1  
Appellants were putative members of that class, but by 
December 2018, the District Court had still not ruled on class 
certification.  Rather than wait for a decision, Appellants filed 
the present “opt-out” complaint bringing the same claims in 
their individual capacities (the “Individual Complaint”).  The 
District Court dismissed the Individual Complaint as untimely 
under the applicable two-year limitations period, concluding 
that the tolling doctrine established in American Pipe & 
Construction Company v. Utah did not apply.2  That doctrine 
 
 
1  The Class Action, In re Valeant Pharms. Int’l 
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 15-cv-7658, was filed in the District Court 
of New Jersey.  





is central to this appeal. 
   
Putative class members may recover as part of the class 
or seek individual recourse, but they generally cannot do both.3  
Complications tend to arise, however, around the class-
certification stage.  Members may initially intend to proceed as 
part of a class, but certification may be denied months or years 
later for reasons outside their control.4  Alternatively, during 
the pendency of a class action, members may discover that 
their individual claims are more valuable than those of the class 
and decide to pursue them in an opt-out complaint even if 
certification is likely.  In either case, members are generally 
allowed to initiate an individual action, but may run into 
limitations issues given the delay.  This is where American 
Pipe comes in. 
 
When a class complaint is filed, American Pipe tolls the 
limitations period governing the individual claims of putative 
members.  In the absence of such a rule, members may feel 
compelled to file duplicative individual suits bringing the same 
claims to protect their rights in the event certification is later 
denied.  Otherwise, members would risk allowing their 
individual limitations periods to expire, potentially leaving 
them with no recourse in the long run.  The doctrine is therefore 
intended to protect the rights of putative members while 
 
 
3  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (noting the 
binding effect of a class judgment unless a member requests to 
be excluded).   
4   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (setting forth 





simultaneously avoiding needless identical lawsuits. 
 
On appeal, the parties dispute whether American Pipe 
tolling applies to individual claims that are filed before a 
certification decision is made.  Appellants argue that the 
limitations period is tolled regardless of the point at which 
individual claims are filed.  Appellees respond, and the District 
Court agreed, that members who wish to benefit from 
American Pipe must wait to file individual claims until after 
the court rules on certification, which Appellants did not do.  
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that American Pipe 
tolled the limitations period for the claims raised in the 








5  The District Court had jurisdiction under Section 
27 of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78aa) and 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
review is de novo.  Pension Tr. Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. 
Mortg. Asset Sec. Trans., Inc., 730 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Because this is an appeal from a dismissal pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the facts in this 
section are as alleged by Appellants.  Foglia v. Renal Ventures 
Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We are 
required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and 
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after 
construing them in the light most favorable to the 





The issue before us relates solely to the timeliness of the 
Individual Complaint, but we will provide a brief recitation of 
the facts for context.  Valeant develops and manufactures 
generic pharmaceuticals.  Appellants purchased stock in 
Valeant during the Relevant Period.  Prior to their purchase, 
the Company changed its business model to focus more on 
acquiring new drugs from other companies rather than 
developing its own.  This approach was intended to 
significantly cut research-and-development costs and allow 
Valeant to market its drugs “more efficiently.”6  In the years 
that followed, Valeant made promising representations about 
the Company’s financial performance based on its new 
business model and approach.  For instance, investors were 
assured that Valeant’s superior marketing and leadership 
resulted in a sales volume that was “greater than price in terms 
of [Valeant’s] growth,” and that the Company was maintaining 
“extremely high ethical standard[s]” in the process.7   
 
As a result of this and other factors, the price of Valeant 
stock skyrocketed nearly 350% by the end of the Relevant 
Period.  Appellants argue that this value was artificially 
inflated, however, and did not accurately represent the 
Company’s financial health.  Specifically, they argue that the 
new business model “relied on a secret, Valeant-controlled 
pharmacy network” and “deceptive practices that exposed the 
Company to enormous risks.”8  This network purportedly 
allowed Valeant to charge third-party purchasers and patients 
 
 
6  App. 49 ¶ 5. 
7  App. 49-50 ¶ 6 (emphasis omitted). 





much higher prices for its drugs than they were worth.  
Following a government investigation and private litigation 
against Valeant, the Company began disclosing its allegedly 
fraudulent practices in late 2015.  A number of Valeant 
executives were fired, and the value of its stock plummeted 
almost 90% by August 2016.  The Company’s shareholders 
claim to have suffered over $76 billion in market capitalization 
losses as a result, which prompted the filing of numerous class 
and individual complaints, including the ones relevant to this 
action.9   
B. 
  
The first complaint in the Class Action was filed in 
October 2015.  Several other class complaints alleging the 
same or similar violations were also filed around this time.  
Those actions were consolidated, and the operative 
consolidated complaint was filed on June 24, 2016 (the “Class 
Complaint”).  The Class Complaint alleged violations of 
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act10 and Rule 10b-
5.11  Those claims were governed by a two-year statute of 
limitations or a five-year repose period, whichever came first.12  
 
 
9  In December 2019, Valeant announced that the 
Class Action had been settled with respect to certain 
defendants, excluding the ones named in the present action, for 
$1.2 billion subject to court approval.   
10  15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a). 
11  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.     
12  See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (Section 10(b) claims 
must be brought within “2 years after the discovery of the facts 





Valeant moved to dismiss the Class Complaint for failure to 
state a claim, which the District Court denied. 
 Prior to a certification decision, on December 19, 2018, 
Appellants filed the Individual Complaint that is the subject of 
this appeal, bringing the same claims under Section 10(b), Rule 
10b-5, and Section 20(a), subject to the same two-year 
limitations and five-year repose periods.  Appellees moved to 
dismiss the Individual Complaint as untimely, arguing that the 
limitations period began to run in June 2016 when the Class 
Complaint was filed and had therefore already expired.13  They 
argued that American Pipe could not save the Individual 
Complaint because it was filed before a certification decision 
 
 
years after such violation.”).  A defendant can only be liable 
under Section 20(a) if there is first a finding of liability under 
another chapter, such as Section 10(b).  See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) 
(“Every person who . . . controls any person liable under any 
provision of this chapter . . . shall also be liable jointly and 
severally with and to the same extent as such controlled 
person.”) (emphasis added).  The viability of the Section 20(a) 
claims therefore depends on the viability of the Section 10(b) 
claims.  If the Section 10(b) claims are untimely, the Section 
20(a) claims must be dismissed as well.   
13  We do not reach this issue today, but the parties 
dispute whether the Individual Complaint would have been 
timely even if we were to conclude that tolling does not apply.  
The District Court concluded that the limitations period began 
to run when the Class Complaint was filed in June 2016 
because at that point, Appellants had sufficient knowledge to 
file their individual claims with sufficient detail and 





was made, and the doctrine was only intended to apply to post-
certification individual claims. 
   
The District Court agreed, adopting its reasoning in a 
related case, and granted Valeant’s motion.14  The District 
Court explained that judicial efficiency—a primary purpose of 
American Pipe—“favors delaying individual claims until after 
a class-certification denial”15 so that identical class and 
individual suits are not unnecessarily proceeding at the same 
time.  It feared that extending American Pipe to individual 
claims filed before a certification ruling would encourage 
copy-cat suits, forcing the courts to deal with “dispositive 
[individual] motions rehashing legal and factual issues” that 
were already resolved in the class context.16  The District Court 
also believed its decision did not prejudice Appellants’ 
individual rights because they could have taken several other 
steps to protect them.  For instance, they could have simply 
filed the Individual Complaint within the initial two-year 
period to be safe, or “waited until [after] the Court’s decision 
 
 
14  See App. 10-11 (“In Northwestern Mutual, the 
Court concluded that American Pipe tolling did not apply to 
the plaintiffs’ claims.  The Court adopts the rationale 
articulated in Northwestern Mutual and reaches the same 
conclusion here.”) (citing Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Valeant 
Pharms. Int’l, Inc., No. 18-15286, 2019 WL 4278929 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 10, 2019)). 
15  Nw. Mut., 2019 WL 4278929, at *10 (quoting 
China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800, 1802 (2018)).   





on class certification” to take advantage of American Pipe 






 Our analysis begins with the history of the American 
Pipe doctrine.  In that case, new parties filed an untimely 
motion to intervene as plaintiffs in a class action after 
certification was denied.18  The lower court denied the 
intervention motion as untimely.19  In reversing that decision, 
the Supreme Court explained that “the commencement of a 
class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to 
all asserted members of the class who would have been parties 
had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.”20  It 
believed that a contrary rule “would deprive . . . class actions 
of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal 
purpose of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23]” because 
“[p]otential class members would be induced to file protective 
motions to intervene or to join in the event that a class was later 
found unsuitable.”21  The Court further explained that this rule 
was consistent with the function of limitations periods 
generally, which is to prevent surprise through the revival of 
 
 
17  Id.  
18  414 U.S. at 544. 
19  See id.  
20  Id. at 554. 





old claims.22  But surprise is not an issue here, because the 
filing of a class complaint notifies the defendant of the 
substantive claims against it as well as the “number and generic 
identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in the 
judgment.”23   
 The Supreme Court extended the doctrine beyond the 
intervention context in Crown, Cork & Seal Company v. 
Parker, holding that it also tolled the limitations periods 
governing the individual claims of class members.24  In doing 
so, the Court explained that “[o]nce the statute of limitations 
has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative 
class until class certification is denied.  At that point, class 
 
 
22  Id. at 554. 
23  Id. at 555; see also Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. 
v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353 (1983) (“Tolling the statute of 
limitations . . . creates no potential for unfair surprise [in class 
actions], regardless of the method class members choose to 
enforce their rights upon denial of class certification.”).  The 
Court also considered the issue briefly in Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, confirming that American Pipe applied to individual 
opt-out actions.  417 U.S. 156, 176 n.13 (1974). 
24  462 U.S. at 350 (“There are many reasons why a 
class member, after the denial of class certification, might 
prefer to bring an individual suit rather than intervene.  The 
forum in which the class action is pending might be an 
inconvenient one, for example, or the class member might not 
wish to share control over the litigation with other plaintiffs 






members may choose to file their own suits.”25   The Court 
recognized that extending American Pipe in this way could 
lead to an increase in litigation, but while “a defendant may 
prefer not to defend against multiple [individual] actions in 
multiple forums once a class has been decertified, this is not an 
interest that statutes of limitations are designed to protect.”26  
And in any event, “avenues exist by which the burdens of 
multiple lawsuits may be avoided,” such as consolidation and 
multidistrict proceedings.27 
The Supreme Court has since declined to apply the 
doctrine in other contexts.  In CalPERS v. ANZ Securities,28 the 
Court held that American Pipe does not toll statutes of repose.  
Unlike limitations periods, which generally begin to run when 
the plaintiff has sufficient knowledge to file a complaint, 
repose periods begin to run when the wrongdoing occurs, 
regardless of the plaintiff’s knowledge.29  While limitations 
periods discourage plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights, 
repose periods reflect a policy determination that defendants 
“should be free from liability after the legislatively determined 
 
 
25  Id. at 354. 
26  Id. at 353. 
27  Id.; see also McKowan Lowe & Co. v. Jasmine, 
Ltd., 295 F.3d 380, 389 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the Court 
was “confident of the capacity of district courts to control 
abuse or ineptitude” that may result as an extension of 
American Pipe to certain class claims). 
28  137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017).   





period of time.”30  Repose periods are therefore not generally 
subject to equitable tolling, and the Court saw no reason to 
make an exception under American Pipe.31   
Later, in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, the Supreme 
Court added that American Pipe does not permit “follow-on 
class action[s]” to be filed “past expiration of the statute of 
limitations.”32  There, the plaintiffs sought to file a new 
untimely class complaint after certification was denied in the 
previous attempt.  They argued that American Pipe applies 
equally to class complaints as it does to individual claims.  In 
rejecting this theory, the Court reasoned that “American Pipe 
 
 
30  Id. (quoting CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 
1, 9 (2014)).   
31  See id. at 2051 (“The purpose and effect of a 
statute of repose . . . is to override customary tolling rules 
arising from the equitable powers of courts. . . . [T]he Court 
repeatedly has stated in broad terms that statutes of repose are 
not subject to equitable tolling.”).  The Court in ANZ also 
rejected the plaintiffs’ constructive-filing argument—i.e., that 
the timely filing of a class complaint actually “brings” a 
plaintiff’s individual suit for purposes of statutory deadlines.  
Id. at 2054-55.  While the filing of a class complaint may put a 
defendant on notice as to the substance of the claims against it, 
it does not actually commence or “bring” the individual action.  
If it did, there would be no need for a “tolling” rule at all, as 
the individual complaint would have been deemed filed on the 
same date the class action was commenced.  Id. at 2055.  To 
the extent Appellants raise a constructive-filing argument here, 
see Appellants’ Br. at 14, we find it unavailing under ANZ.    





tolls the limitation period for individual claims because 
economy of litigation favors delaying those claims until after a 
class-certification denial. . . . With class claims, on the other 
hand, efficiency favors early assertion” so that the appropriate 
representatives can be named.33  It continued that “[t]he time 
to file individual actions once a class action ends is finite,” but 
“the time for filing successive class suits, if tolling were 
allowed, could be limitless.”34  The plaintiffs’ view would have 
“allow[ed] the statute of limitations to be extended time and 
again; as each class [was] denied certification, a new named 
plaintiff could file a class complaint [to] resuscitate[] the 
litigation.”35  The Court declined to construe the doctrine in 
this way, which would certainly not promote the efficiency of 




Though the Supreme Court has not yet done so, several 
other Courts of Appeals have considered the question before 
us.  Appellants ask us to join the view of the Second, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuits, which have held that American Pipe tolls 
the limitations period for individual claims filed both before 
and after the certification stage.  As the Second Circuit 
explained: 
American Pipe rests [on] the 
notion that class members are 
 
 
33  Id. at 1806-07 (emphasis added). 
34  Id. at 1809. 
35  Id. at 1808.   





treated as parties to the class action 
“until and unless they received 
notice thereof and chose not to 
continue.”  Because members of 
the asserted class are treated for 
limitations purposes as having 
instituted their own actions, at 
least so long as they continue to be 
members of the class, the 
limitations period does not run 
against them during that time.  
Once they cease to be members of 
the class—for instance, when they 
opt out or when the certification 
decision excludes them—the 
limitation period begins to run 
again on their claims.  Nothing in 
the Supreme Court decisions . . . 
suggests that the rule should be 
otherwise for a plaintiff who files 
an individual action before 
certification is resolved.37   
 
The Second Circuit further reasoned that though American 
Pipe was concerned with judicial economy, the doctrine was 
primarily “created to protect class members from being forced 
 
 
37  In re Worldcom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 255 
(2d Cir. 2007) (quoting American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551) 





to file individual suits in order to preserve their claims.”38  The 
doctrine was not intended to prioritize convenience over its 
core equitable purpose.39 
 
 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have followed the Second 
Circuit’s lead.  In In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation 
Litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that pre-certification 
individual claims were subject to tolling, noting that class 
members “have a right to file at the time of their choosing[,] 
and denying tolling would diminish that right.”40  The Tenth 
Circuit also saw no reason to deny tolling, as doing so would 
essentially “lock[] putative members into the class” until 
certification in some cases, which makes particularly little 
sense in light of how long it can take to reach that stage.41  In 
fact, the Tenth Circuit believed that restricting American Pipe 
in this way “ha[d] the potential to backfire” and could “compel 
individual class members to make a choice as the limitations 
period for their individual claim approaches: file an individual 
action now or sit tight for a class certification decision, no 
 
 
38  Id. at 256. 
39  Id. (explaining that the doctrine was “not meant 
to induce class members to forgo their right to sue 
individually”).   
40  534 F.3d 986, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008).   
41  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 
F.3d 1223, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting the seven-year 
period between the filing of the class complaint and 
certification, and the potential costs associated with further 





matter how long it might take.”42  The court anticipated that 
“[l]itigants in this bind might file placeholder suits rather than 
risk placing their individual actions on ice during a potentially 
prolonged class certification process.”43   
 
 We are aware of only one federal appellate court that 
has held otherwise.44  In Wyser-Pratte Management Company 
v. Telxon Corporation, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs 
 
 
42  Id. at 1234. 
43  Id.  
44  The parties appear to disagree as to whether the 
First Circuit has squarely reached this issue.  Glater v. Eli Lilly 
& Company involved a personal-jurisdiction issue where the 
plaintiff was party to a class action and related individual suit.  
712 F.2d 735 (1st Cir. 1983).  The plaintiff commenced her 
individual action before certification was resolved.  She argued 
that her citizenship in the individual case should have been 
determined as of the date the class action was filed and, in 
doing so, attempted to invoke American Pipe principles.  Id. at 
739.  In rejecting this theory, the First Circuit noted that 
“[e]ven assuming that American Pipe may have some 
relevance [in this context, it] . . . says nothing about [plaintiff’s] 
ability to maintain a separate action while class certification is 
still pending.  The policies behind . . . American Pipe . . . would 
be disserved[] by guaranteeing a separate suit at the same time 
that a class action is ongoing.”  Id.  Though the First Circuit 
invoked American Pipe principles in dicta, its holding was 
confined to the personal-jurisdiction question before that court, 
and we find its reasoning unpersuasive in any event for the 





had forfeited the benefit of American Pipe by filing individual 
claims before a certification decision had been made.45  The 
court believed its conclusion was consistent with cases like 
Crown, which described American Pipe as tolling the 
limitations period “until class certification is denied.”46  This 
characterization arguably supports the conclusion that 
American Pipe tolling is contingent on a certification denial.    
The Sixth Circuit, which was the first to decide this issue, has 
since called its conclusion into question, noting that Wyser-
Pratte “represents the minority rule” and that the court “ha[s] 
doubts about its holding.”47 
 






Appellants argue that the District Court misapplied 
American Pipe, and that class members should not be forced to 
 
 
45  413 F.3d 553, 569 (6th Cir. 2005).   
46  Id. (quoting Crown, 462 U.S. at 354).   
47  Stein v. Regions Morgan Keegan Select High 
Income Fund, Inc., 821 F.3d 780, 789 (6th Cir. 2016).  Wyser-
Pratte also relied somewhat heavily on the district court’s 
reasoning in In re Worldcom, which the Second Circuit later 
reversed.  See supra (discussing the Second Circuit’s 
approach); Wyser-Pratte, 413 F.3d at 569 (citing In re 
Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 431, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 





wait until after a certification decision to benefit from the 
doctrine.  We agree, and adopt the reasoning of the Second, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.  American Pipe makes clear that the 
filing of a class action is the operative event that tolls the 
limitations period, and that once the period is tolled, it remains 
tolled for all putative members until they are no longer part of 
the class.48  The Court has not held that anything further, such 
as a certification denial, is required to benefit from tolling.  
Like the majority of our sister circuits, we see no reason not to 
take the Supreme Court’s words at face value.49  
 
Tolling was primarily intended to benefit putative or 
unidentified members of the class, who are considered “mere 
passive beneficiaries of the action brought [on] their behalf.”50  
Our conclusion that American Pipe is triggered automatically 
upon the filing of a class complaint is consistent with the well-
founded principle that members need not actively monitor case 
 
 
48  American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553. 
49  See In re Worldcom, 496 F.3d at 255 (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that ‘the commencement 
of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations 
as to all asserted members of the class who would have been 
parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class 
action.’  We see no reason not to take this statement at face 
value.”) (quoting Crown, 462 U.S. at 353-54); see also 
Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 
2018) (noting that American Pipe “included no express 
restrictions in the broad language it used to describe the claims 
to which tolling would apply”).     





developments to benefit from Rule 23 protection.51  The 
approach we adopt today is also consistent with the function of 
limitations periods generally.  As the Supreme Court affirmed 
in both American Pipe and Crown, statutes of limitations are 
intended to prevent the “surprise” revival of old claims that 
plaintiffs failed to diligently pursue.52  But surprise is not an 
issue in this context.53  This is particularly so under the facts 
before us, where the Appellees were undisputedly aware of the 
substantive claims at issue for more than two years before the 
Individual Complaint was filed.  Appellees will not be 
prejudiced if they are required to defend themselves against 
claims they have known about since 2016.54   
 
We also conclude that denying tolling in this context, 
i.e., where members filed individual claims after the initial 
limitations period expired but before a certification decision, 
would serve no compelling purpose.  In this posture, the 
District Court’s rule would essentially “lock” putative 
 
 
51  See id. (“Rule 23 is not designed to afford class 
action representation only to those who are active participants 
in or even aware of the proceedings.”).  
52  See id. at 554; Crown, 462 U.S. at 353. 
53  Crown, 462 U.S. at 353. 
54  As Crown makes clear, a defendant’s desire not 
to defend against similar claims in multiple proceedings is not 
one that statutes of limitations are designed to protect.  Id.  






members into the class until after certification.55  Class 
members, even those intent on proceeding individually, would 
be forced to delay filing their claims indefinitely just to take 
advantage of American Pipe.  Such a requirement is potentially 
costly, and certainly inefficient.56  It can take years for a class 
action to reach the certification stage, and, in the meantime, 
members may “deem their own claims valuable enough” to 
pursue in an opt-out complaint, or otherwise decide that “class 
certification is doubtful.”57  The approach we adopt today will 
allow members in either situation to promptly file their 
individual actions, rather than indefinitely delay the resolution 
of those claims for no good reason.   
 
We disagree with the District Court that Appellants 
would not be prejudiced if their Individual Complaint is 
dismissed as untimely because there were technically other 
options available to them.58  Appellees do not dispute that 
American Pipe applies to individual claims filed after 
certification, and they suggest that Appellants could have 
 
 
55  State Farm, 540 F.3d at 1233 (“[L]ocking 
putative class members into the class until the class 
certification decision makes little sense and could adversely 
affect certain individuals.”).     
56  See id.    
57  Id.  
58  See Nw. Mut., 2019 WL 4278929, at *10 (“Given 
that Northwestern Mutual’s claims would be timely if [it] had 
pursued a different course of action, the Court cannot conclude 
that failing to expand American Pipe in this instance would 





simply waited until that point if they wanted to avoid any 
tolling and timeliness issues.  But this approach makes little 
sense for the reasons we have already articulated—it would 
leave members who decide to proceed individually after the 
limitations period would have normally run but before 
certification in limbo for an indefinite period of time.59  
Appellees also suggest that Appellants could have assumed 
tolling did not apply and brought the Individual Complaint 
within the initial two-year period to be safe.  But the doctrine 
would serve no purpose if members were expected to file their 
individual claims within the first two years regardless.  In fact, 
suggesting that members should do so—just to avoid 
timeliness problems—tends to encourage the duplicative “just 




Appellees respond that we should not be swayed by the 
Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits’ approach because those 
decisions pre-date ANZ and China Agritech.  We recognize that 
the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence tends to underscore 
the importance of judicial economy, but we cannot construe the 
doctrine in a way that would undermine its primary purpose—
to protect the individual rights of putative members. While 
American Pipe was established in part to avoid duplicative 
filings, it is, at its core, an equitable doctrine.60  That doctrine 
 
 
59  This approach is especially untenable because of 
the competing repose period in this case, as discussed infra. 
60  See ANZ, 137 S. Ct. at 2052 (“The balance of the 
Court’s reasoning [in American Pipe] . . . reveals a rule based 





was “created to protect class members from being forced to file 
individual suits in order to preserve their claims.”61  The 
District Court’s view would surely cause at least certain 
members to forfeit their individual rights, simply (and 
ironically) because they filed too early.62   
 
We have previously recognized that while this Court 
remains “concerned with judicial economy . . . it need not be 
 
 
time bar where its rigid application would create injustice”); 
see also In re Worldcom, 496 F.3d at 256 (“The district court 
may be correct that its conception of the American Pipe rule 
would reduce the number of individual suits filed by class 
members.  But this is beside the point.  While reduction in the 
number of suits may be an incidental benefit of the American 
Pipe doctrine, it was not the purpose of American Pipe either 
to reduce the number of suits filed, or to force individual 
plaintiffs to make an early decision whether to proceed by 
individual suit or rely on a class representative.”).   
61  In re Worldcom, 496 F.3d at 256 (emphasis in 
original).   
62  See id. at 255 (“As the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly emphasized, the initiation of a class action puts the 
defendants on notice of the claims against them.  A defendant 
is no less on notice when putative class members file individual 
suits before certification. . . . [T]he same is certainly true of 
class members who file individual suits before the court 
decides certification”) (internal citation omitted); see also In re 
Hanford, 534 F.3d at 1009 (explaining that plaintiffs “have a 
right to file at the time of their choosing and denying tolling 





achieved at the expense of litigants for whom the American 
Pipe tolling rule was designed.”63  This observation rings 
equally true here, and we are not convinced that efficiency 
concerns should trump the doctrine’s core equitable purpose.64  
 
 
63  McKowan, 295 F.3d at 389.  
64  In theory, extending American Pipe to pre-
certification individual claims may lead to an increase in 
litigation.  See Crown, 462 U.S. at 353 (recognizing the risk of 
increased litigation but noting that this was not an interest 
limitations periods are designed to protect); see also ANZ, 137 
S. Ct. at 2054 (“District Courts, furthermore, have ample 
means and methods to administer their dockets and to ensure 
that any additional filings proceed in an orderly fashion.”).  But 
this risk may not be as high as Appellees suggest.  Common 
sense tells us that when a member determines his or her claims 
are substantially more valuable than those of the class, he or 
she is likely to pursue an individual complaint no matter what.  
See State Farm, 540 F.3d at 1233 (members may decide to 
proceed individually because they “deem their own claims 
valuable enough”).  Members who file individual claims before 
certification are likely the same members who—if forced to 
wait until after certification—would have opted out regardless.  
See id. (“[M]ost litigants with claims valuable enough to 
pursue separately will likely have filed their individual claims 
before the end of their own limitations period.  As such, the 
group that would file individual suits during the window at 
issue here is likely to approximate in number the group that 
would later opt-out if a class is certified or file individual suits 





And though China Agritech describes “efficiency and 
economy of litigation” as the “watchwords of American 
Pipe,”65 that decision does not cast any doubt on the approach 
we adopt today.  There, the Supreme Court declined to extend 
American Pipe in a way that would have allowed for the 
constant revival of otherwise untimely class claims.66  Our 
conclusion that American Pipe tolls the limitations period 
governing pre-certification individual claims does not pose the 
risk of endless tolling.67  
  
Appellees also suggest that this Court’s decision in 
Weitzner is inconsistent with the Second Circuit’s approach.  
Weitzner did not involve the issue that is before us, but we 
observed in passing that “American Pipe is designed to protect 
individual claims filed after the denial of class certification.”68  
We recognize that American Pipe tolling may have been 
anticipated to apply most commonly in the post-certification 
 
 
suits so much as it will simply avoid an unnecessarily delayed 
filing of opt-out claims.   
65  138 S. Ct. at 1811.  
66  Id. at 1808. 
67  See id. at 1809.  Nor does the Court’s decision in 
ANZ compel a different result.  In ANZ, the Court declined to 
extend American Pipe to statutes of repose.  137 S. Ct. at 2051.  
Repose periods are fundamentally different from statutes of 
limitation like the one before us.  Id.  The ANZ decision also 
rejected a “constructive filing” theory that is not dispositive in 
this case.  Id. at 2054-55. 





context, and that this idea is accordingly reflected in the 
relevant case law.69  But nothing in our precedent suggests that 
American Pipe applies exclusively to post-certification claims.  
What we can discern from the existing jurisprudence, however, 
is that American Pipe tolling begins, for all putative members, 
when the class action is commenced.  Our decision reflects a 
straightforward application of this principle.    
C.  
 
Finally, we also find the District Court’s holding 
untenable because it would lead to counterintuitive results.  
Should we affirm that decision, individual claims filed well 
before certification could be dismissed as untimely, while other 
claims filed at a much later date would be allowed to proceed.  
Class members who were “contemplating opting out and filing 
their own lawsuits would be penalized for giving the 
defendants and the Court earlier notice.”70  We have sought to 
avoid similar outcomes in other contexts and see no compelling 
reason not to do so here.71   
 
 
69  See, e.g., China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1804. 
70  Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. E. Mushroom Mktg. 
Coop., No. 15-6480, 2019 WL 130535, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 
2019). 
71  See Wallach v. Eaton Corp., 837 F.3d 356, 374 
(3d Cir. 2016) (explaining, in the presumption-of-timeliness 
context, that “if the presumption of timeliness applied only to 
certified classes, . . . motions to intervene brought prior to class 
certification might be deemed untimely, even though those 
same motions would be timely if brought years later, after a 





Appellees respond that “the potential for [anomalous] 
results exists under any equitable tolling doctrine,” and so we 
need not worry much about it in this scenario.72  Even if that 
were true, the issue is compounded by the competing statute of 
repose in this case.  As evidenced by the timeline before us, 
putative members may not become aware of any wrongdoing 
until after a class complaint is filed or the fraud is otherwise 
made public.73  But by that point, the repose period is likely to 
have been already running in the background for some time.74  
In the event a certification ruling is made more than five years 
after the wrongdoing took place, some members would be 
forced to file individually before certification regardless.  If 
they did, however, the District Court’s rule would likely 
require dismissal of those claims under the limitations period 
because they would have been filed before certification.  But if 
 
 
efficiency . . . emphasized . . . in American Pipe militate that 
we extend the presumption of timeliness . . . to the pre-
certification context.”) (emphasis added); McKowan, 295 F.3d 
at 389 (explaining that there was “no good reason” why the 
class claims of intervening members “should not be tolled 
where the district court had not yet reached the issue of the 
validity of the class”).   
72  Appellees’ Br. at 7. 
73  See ANZ, 137 S. Ct. at 2049 (noting that repose 
periods begin to run when the wrongdoing occurs); see also Br. 
of Amicus Curiae Fir Tree Capital Management LP in Support 
of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9 (“Amicus Br.”).   
74  For example, in this case, the first fraudulent 
misrepresentation is alleged to have been made in 2013, but the 





those members waited until after certification to take 
advantage of American Pipe, their claims could be barred by 
the repose period.  We cannot imagine that American Pipe was 
intended to force plaintiffs into this sort of bind.75 
This issue is perhaps best illustrated by example.  
Imagine that a company makes a fraudulent statement in 2020.  
The fraud is not uncovered until 2022, and a class complaint is 
filed the same year.76  As here, the class claims (and 
corresponding individual claims) are governed by a two-year 
limitations period and a five-year repose period, whichever 
comes first.  By 2024, the class action is progressing, but there 
has been no certification ruling.  Class members are comforted 
by the fact that their individual claims are covered by American 
Pipe and see no reason to file individually at that time.  But by 
early 2025, there is still no certification ruling, and anxious 
members cognizant of the repose period decide to file their own 
complaints and proceed individually instead.  A class is finally 
certified in 2026.  In this scenario, the District Court’s rule 
would require us to find the individual complaints untimely 
under the limitations period because they would have been 
 
 
75  Nothing in ANZ suggests otherwise.  Though the 
Supreme Court declined to extend tolling to statutes of repose, 
it did not consider the interplay of repose and limitations 
periods in this context or the problems likely to arise.  See ANZ, 
137 S. Ct. at 2049-54.  
76  For purposes of this illustration, we assume the 
statute of limitations would have, in the absence of tolling, 
started to run upon the filing of the class complaint.  Appellees 
argue that this is the case here, though we need not decide that 





filed pre-certification and therefore not subject to tolling.  But 
if those members waited to file until after certification to take 
advantage of American Pipe, the repose period would have 
already expired.  Members in this position would be without 
any individual recourse, which is precisely the result American 
Pipe seeks to avoid.   
Appellees downplay the repose issue by pointing out 
that it will not be a universal problem.  Not every case involves 
a competing repose period, but that does not change the fact 
that the one before us does, as will any class action bringing 
similar securities fraud claims.  We also find the analysis of the 
amicus, which points to 92 recent class actions where 
certification was not resolved within five years of the 
beginning class period, persuasive on this point.77  Under the 
District Court’s rule, any member whose claims are subject to 
a repose period may very well have no choice but to file within 
the initial two years to avoid forfeiting their individual rights.  
The tolling doctrine would serve no purpose in this context, 
 
 
77  The issue of whether the repose period has 
expired is not before us today.  But the timing in this case 
illustrates the problems that may arise in similar scenarios.  
Here, the first misrepresentation alleged in the Class Complaint 
was made in January 2013, but a class was not certified until 
May 2020.  If Appellants had waited until after certification to 
file their Individual Complaint with the hopes of benefitting 
from American Pipe tolling, their claims could have been 
barred by the repose period, and they would have been “forced 





and we are not convinced that the Supreme Court intended or 
envisioned such a result.78     
IV. 
  
For these reasons, we conclude that the statutes of 
limitations governing the claims raised in the Individual 
Complaint are subject to American Pipe tolling.  Because we 
hold that the limitations period has been tolled, we need not 
decide whether the Individual Complaint was timely in the 
absence of tolling.  
 
We will vacate the District Court’s order and remand 
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
78  Even where there is a competing repose period at 
issue, members will generally always have the option to 
proceed as part of the class or file their individual claims within 
the initial limitations period without relying on tolling.  But 
American Pipe was intended to protect the individual rights of 
members while encouraging, but not forcing, class 
participation.  See American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551-53; Crown, 
462 U.S. at 351-53 (noting that Rule 23 encourages class 
participation but that members must still have a “meaningful” 
right to opt out and pursue individual claims, which justifies 
the tolling rule) (citing Eisen, 417 U.S. at 176 n.13).  And for 
the same reasons we have already expressed, it makes little 
sense to establish a tolling rule if members are encouraged to 
file their individual claims within the initial two-year period 
regardless, under the assumption that tolling may not apply. 
